By Bob Hall

3 October 2021 marks the 50^th anniversary of the 1971 Presidential election in the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). While debate has swirled around questions of which military strategy was best – Westmoreland’s attrition strategy or Abrams’ pacification strategy[1] – the political strategy has received little attention. Yet the campaign was acknowledged by all participants as essentially a political struggle, albeit one waged with the tools of war. Unlike conventional war, victory in counterinsurgency campaigns rarely comes through military action. Instead, although military action remains a key component of any campaign, counterinsurgencies tend to be resolved politically or diplomatically. This primacy of politics in insurgencies was well understood by the leaders of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) and the National Liberation Front (the Viet Cong), during the Vietnam War. Le Duan, a leading member of the Communist Party Central Committee in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and instrumental in directing the insurgency in the south, stated that:

Military struggle coupled with political struggle is the fundamental form of revolutionary violence in the South, and the combination of the two is the fundamental rule of revolutionary war.[2]

Ho Chi Minh, Vo Nguyen Giap and other leading lights in the DRV agreed. They emphasised the need to gain and maintain the political support of the people if there was to be any chance of the insurgency successfully overthrowing the government in the south.[3] The authors of the Australian Army’s doctrine for the conduct of what it then called Counter Revolutionary Warfare, had no quarrel with these opinions. The doctrine asserted that

A revolutionary war, unlike a war between sovereign states, is an internal struggle without fronts or frontiers to seize control of the government of a country. … The main part of the struggle is political. Counterinsurgency operations are simultaneously political and military in their nature. There is no purely military solution.[4]

Leading COIN theorists like David Galula also recognised the primacy of politics.[5] More recently the US FM3-24 notes that ‘insurgents aim to force political change; any military action is secondary and subordinate, a means to an end’.[6]

The political struggle was mainly about the establishment of political legitimacy, the acceptance of the right to govern by the citizens of South Vietnam and recognition by the international order. Though there was much more to South Vietnamese politics and the development of political legitimacy than the Presidential elections, this article focuses on the little understood and often overlooked 1971 Republic of Vietnam Presidential election.[7]

A new democratic constitution for the Republic had been brought into effect on 1 April 1967 and the first Presidential election under this new constitution was conducted in early September 1967.[8] In that earlier election eleven slates of Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates had competed for election. The election had been won by President Nguyen Van Thieu with Nguyen Cao Ky as his Vice President. The large number of competing slates had split the vote resulting in the Thieu/Ky slate winning with 34.8% of the vote. Their nearest competitor, the Dzu/Chieu Slate achieved only 17.2% of the vote, and the remaining 48% of votes were distributed across the other nine slates.[9] The winning Thieu/Ky slate was unable to claim that it represented the political will of the people of South Vietnam since it had been supported by only 34.8% of eligible voters. It lacked political legitimacy.

Unlike conventional wars, the Vietnam War was essentially a struggle for political legitimacy with guns. The National Liberation Front and later, their Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG),[10] comprised communist and some nationalist interests in South Vietnam dedicated to the overthrow of the Thieu government. The PRG claimed that they represented to true political aspirations of the people of South Vietnam. The results of the September 1967 Presidential election left Thieu in a weak position in his efforts to refute the claim to political legitimacy of the PRG. Under the 1967 constitution, the President could serve for two four-year terms. President Thieu therefore faced re-election in the 3 October 1971 Presidential election campaign. Thieu was determined to avoid the problems of the 1967 presidential election which had failed to provide the legitimacy he needed in his political struggle with the PRG.

By October 1971 the military and political situation in the Republic of Vietnam had changed substantially. US troop numbers in Vietnam had fallen from a high of over half a million in June 1969 to about 180,000 by October 1971.[11] US public support for the war had also fallen dramatically. In 1965 when the first US combat troops were deployed to South Vietnam, Gallup polling showed that over 65% of Americans supported the war. However, by October 1971 about 60% of those polled thought that sending US forces to Vietnam was a mistake.[12] There had also been dramatic shifts in international relations. On 15 July 1971 President Nixon announced that he would visit China the following year raising questions in the Thieu government about continuing US support. The Australian Ambassador in Saigon, Arthur Morris, wrote a lengthy paper to Nigel Bowen, Minister for Foreign Affairs, explaining some of the implications of these changes.

[Thieu’s] close associate and adviser, Hoang Duc Nha, had been to the United States in June and returned to tell the President that opinion in America had hardened so much against Viet-Nam that there was now no way of improving it. In these circumstances it is not surprising that President Thieu was not concerned with international reaction to his attempts to ensure that he won the Presidential elections with a substantial majority. President Nixon’s announcement of the visit to Peking was also taken in Saigon as being a sign that the Americans might be seeking a solution to the Vietnamese problem over the heads of the Vietnamese. These signs, plus [US Ambassador Ellsworth] Bunker’s heavy-handed and much publicized meetings with various candidates, must have served to harden Thieu’s approach. His close advisers had also assured him that America could not afford to withhold aid from Saigon and that he had no need to worry about any cutoff of American aid, particularly while American troops still remain in Viet-Nam. It is just possible that his strong stand in the face of American pressure may have heightened his prospects as a Vietnamese nationalist.[13]

On 23 June 1971 a new Presidential Election Law was promulgated by the Republic of Vietnam government. Whereas the 1967 Constitution and Electoral Laws allowed almost anyone to stand as a candidate for election to the Presidency, the new Presidential Election Law required all candidates for election to obtain endorsements of either 40 (of 197) National Assembly members or 100 (of 550) provincial and/or municipal Councillors. These endorsements were to be certified by the chairman of the Senate or House of Representatives, or, in the case of provincial or municipal endorsements, by the Province Chief or municipal Mayor. This new provision had been instigated by Thieu to achieve a number of outcomes. It aimed to discourage frivolous candidates and create a clear-cut contest between a small number of candidates, preferably two, each with proven public support. It also helped to compensate for South Vietnam’s poorly developed political party system.[14] However its main benefit was to limit the number of Presidential Election candidates to ensure that the winning candidate would have the votes of greater than 50% of eligible voters. Three candidates might produce this result but a two candidate race certainly would. The winner would then be able to claim to represent the political aspirations of the majority of South Vietnamese eligible voters.[15]

Opponents of the new Presidential Election Law claimed that it sought to benefit the incumbent, Thieu, by excluding opposition candidates. There is little doubt that it did indeed benefit Thieu as the incumbent. As President he was assured of amassing the requisite endorsements. But this benefit seems not unreasonable. Since the aim of seeking endorsements was to establish that the candidate had proven public support, Thieu or any future incumbent, having been elected four years earlier, could claim this status anyway. Some critics also claimed that it was unconstitutional. However, on 13 July 1971 the Republic of Vietnam Supreme Court ruled that the new law was indeed constitutional.

 

The political ‘heavyweights’ of South Vietnam at the time were President Nguyen Van Thieu, Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, and General Duong Van (‘Big’) Minh. A Central Intelligence Agency report written in June 1971, over four months before the election, assessed the electoral prospects of the three main candidates. Thieu was seen as the ‘front runner’, while ‘Big’ Minh would have no difficulty acquiring the necessary endorsements. However, Minh hoped that Ky would also be a candidate because his presence on the ballot would ‘cut into Thieu’s voting support thereby strengthening Minh’.[16] The report noted that Ky might have difficulty meeting the requirements of the new electoral law, but would overcome this problem. However, the CIA report also noted that nothing was certain and both Minh and Ky may withdraw from the race leaving Thieu the only candidate. It continued:

The effects of such a joint withdrawal would be to damage severely the international standing of the Thieu government and bring into question the validity of the election. On the internal scene, a withdrawal by Ky and Minh and the subsequent election of Thieu without significant opposition would create some domestic tension and would bring Thieu back into office under a cloud. It would confront him with the problem of governing in the face of constant criticism of his mandate. And this in turn would raise the spectre of a turbulent four years for the [Government of Vietnam] and the possible use of repressive measures to mute the criticism.[17]

On 29 July 1971 both President Thieu and General Duong Van Minh filed their candidacy for the Presidency. Thieu and his running mate, Tran Van Huong, possibly aiming to exclude his rival, Nguyen Cao Ky from the race thus limiting it to a ‘two horse race’ with the certainty of the winner taking a clear majority of votes, quickly secured 104 of 197 National Assembly and 452 of a possible 550 Council endorsements, far more than required under the electoral laws. A few days later, on 4 August, Nguyen Cao Ky (and his running mate Truong Vinh Le) announced candidature for the election. He had achieved the properly certified endorsement of only 61 Councillors falling short of the required 100, but he held a further 41 uncertified endorsements from Councillors who had initially endorsed Thieu but now wanted to switch their endorsement to Ky.[18]

The following day, 5 August, the Republic of Vietnam Supreme Court announced the candidate list for the election. Both Thieu and Minh were listed but Ky was not, having failed to achieve the necessary 100 properly certified Councillor endorsements. Thieu believed he had achieved his desired ‘two horse race’ but on 7 August Ky stated that it remained his intention to run.[19]

However, on 20 August, Minh withdrew his candidacy claiming the election was rigged, leaving Thieu uncontested. This was not unexpected. In the preceding days Minh had made several threats to withdraw and in the months leading to his withdrawal he had run a very lacklustre election campaign failing to develop an effective campaign team and never leaving Saigon.[20] As early as June, US Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, possibly drawing on the CIA assessment, had told the Australian Ambassador, Arthur Morris, that ‘it would not surprise him if “Big” Minh “chickened out”’ of the Presidential race’. But Bunker seemed disillusioned with Minh when this in fact happened. Morris noted that:

The failure of American policy seems to me to lie in the failure to understand after so many years the fact of Vietnamese political life. We were told by American sources (Vann and Funkhauser, senior American advisers in [Military Region 2 and Military Region 3] as early as June that they had positive proof that Thieu was buying up Provincial Councillors at a great rate and that he was attempting “overkill” in his efforts to exclude Ky from the elections. It seems strange that at a later date the American Ambassador who said he had trusted Thieu, should have been surprised and disillusioned that Thieu had “deceived him”.[21]

Morris continued:

Bunker’s apparent sudden disillusionment with Minh is therefore hard to understand. Minh is a man of great pride who was Chief of the General Staff when President Thieu was a young Major. It always seemed obvious to me that Minh would not run in an election and be beaten by a junior officer merely in order to make the election presentable to the American domestic electorate. The idea of Minh being a “good leader of the opposition” in a country dominated by President Thieu was just never one of the realities of Vietnamese politics.[22]

However, the following day, the Supreme Court ruled that Ky’s candidature was now valid.[23] The court held that Thieu had obtained endorsements from both National Assembly members and Provincial and Municipal Councillors and that this was contrary to the intention of the Presidential election law. According to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the law candidates should get endorsements from one or the other, but not both. This ruling, which a CIA report claimed was the result of Thieu’s lobbying,[24] freed up Councillor endorsements which then became available to Ky making his candidacy valid. The Supreme Court then posted the list of candidates for the second and final time, this time listing Thieu and Ky as the Presidential candidates. Thieu again had his preferred ‘two horse race’. Under the electoral laws, no candidate could withdraw their candidacy after the second posting.

In a further twist, on 23 August, Ky demanded that he be withdrawn from the Presidential race claiming without evidence that the election would not be run fairly.[25] Instead of proceeding with the election, he proposed that both he and Thieu resign and that the Chairman of the Upper House of the National Assembly take over as President for a period of not more than three months during which a new Presidential election would be organised. This was a process described in the electoral law but was applicable only when the President or Vice-President were unable to fulfil their duties. Its application to the situation in August 1971 was not clear cut. Ky’s intent was to deny Thieu the benefits of incumbency.

The Australian Ambassador, Arthur Morris believed that, like ‘Big’ Minh, Ky would also withdraw from the race because he knew that in an election race between himself and Thieu, Thieu would clearly win.[26]

On 31 August the Supreme Court agreed to the withdrawal of Ky’s candidacy leaving Thieu’s candidacy uncontested. However, Thieu was obliged under the Republic’s 1967 Constitution to proceed with the election on 3 October, even though it was uncontested. A few days later, on 2 September, one month before polling day, in a nation-wide address, Thieu announced that his candidacy was uncontested but that the election must be held in accordance with the constitution. He stated

I need the indisputable confidence of the people of South Viet-Nam in me, in my platform and policies. This act of confidence should be clearly expressed, in a free and democratic way through the ballot box in the forthcoming election. … If the results of the election show a clearcut confidence of the people in me, I will interpret it as the people’s entrusting me with another four-year term. If the results show clearly that the people do not have confidence in me, then I will voluntarily step aside and not accept another four-year term. I will also rule myself out entirely as a candidate again.[27]

In another national television address on 11 September Thieu added further detail. He would not continue in office if he received less than 50% of the vote. Furthermore, he explained to voters that they could express no confidence in his Presidency by casting an invalid vote. He explained that this could be done by marking or tearing the ballot paper or by casting an empty ballot envelope.[28]

Meanwhile Vice President Ky was mounting political attacks on his own government and the Thieu Presidency. On the morning of 1 October he chaired a meeting of the People’s Committee Against Dictatorship attended by 1500 people. At the meeting

He made an inflammatory speech at which he said that those who opposed Thieu should take to the streets and to overthrow Thieu’s dictatorship by any means possible. He advocated marching on the Independence Palace, the Supreme Court, the Senate and the National Assembly.[29]

Vice President Ky was calling for a coup, a return to violence as a method of political change, against his own government. However, Saigon was under police control and Ky’s supporters failed to appear on the streets. Later that day Ky’s press office denied that Ky had taken a leading role in the meeting and claimed that he had not called upon the people to march against the government. However, the press office also promulgated Ky’s ‘Three no’s’ policy: No participation in the election; no casting of ballots; no recognition of the results of the election. An Australian Embassy report to the Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra, noted that

There were many predictions made that today [1 October] would be the high point of Ky’s programme of resistance and that violence might ensue. If this were Ky’s intention it has failed. Badly.[30]

With President Thieu facing an uncontested election and Vice President Ky stoking anti-government disquiet the situation presented an opportunity for the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG). Since the beginning of the Paris peace negotiations in 1968 they and their supporters in Hanoi had called for Thieu’s removal as a precondition to the achievement of any peace deal. The PRG had also claimed to be the true representatives of the political aspirations of the citizens of South Vietnam, an argument helped by the results of the 1967 election. Furthermore, they and Hanoi also boasted repeatedly that they controlled ‘three quarters of the people and two thirds of the countryside’. Thieu’s call for those who opposed his leadership to invalidate their votes gave the PRG the opportunity to participate in this election. They could instruct those they claimed to ‘control’ to vote against Thieu by casting an invalid vote. They could have declared a ceasefire and allowed the poll to proceed under the gaze of a large number of international election observers and the world’s media adding credibility and validating their expected overwhelming political victory. That they did none of these things shows that their political claims were empty. Instead, they opposed the elections.

The lead up to Polling day

On 21 September, 12 days before polling day, 4RAR/NZ encountered elements of 33 PAVN Regiment in the battle of Nui Le near the northern border of Phuoc Tuy Province.[31] Although it has been claimed that the incursion of 33 PAVN Regiment into northern Phuoc Tuy Province was an attempt to give 1ATF a ‘bloody nose’ before it returned to Australia,[32] this seems highly unlikely. Instead, the battle is more likely to be linked to the Presidential election. It was part of a general increase in enemy activity throughout South Vietnam and therefore is unlikely to relate to events occurring only in Phuoc Tuy Province.

Enemy activity In Military Region I was at a low level throughout September ‘however [there was] a slight rise in Quang Tri Province on the night of 20/21 Sep[tember]’.[33] Similarly, there was a rise in enemy initiated incidents in Military Region 2 in the last week of September. In Military Region 3, which included Phuoc Tuy Province, there was a major attack on an 18 ARVN Division base at Tay Ninh City in which the ARVN lost 21 men killed and 63 wounded while the enemy lost over 52 killed and seven prisoners of war.[34] A second surge of enemy activity occurred a few days later when ‘there was a marked increase in enemy attacks on ARVN bases and camps, particularly in Tay Ninh Province’.[35] Seen in this context, the battle of Nui Le in Phuoc Tuy Province appears to be part of this broader enemy activity rather than a response to the imminent withdrawal of 1ATF.[36] Furthermore, an attack on 1ATF to deliver a ‘bloody nose’ before it withdrew from the theatre does not fit with VC/PAVN strategy. The Australian task force was going to withdraw anyway. The VC/PAVN were unlikely to risk losses in men and equipment on a useless gesture when strength should be preserved for the coming battles against the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN).

The enemy Regiment had moved into northern Phuoc Tuy Province from neighbouring Long Khanh Province in the days before the battle erupted. This move may have been intended to place the Regiment closer to Phuoc Tuy’s population centres in readiness to exploit political disruption following the election. Ky’s inflammatory rhetoric and his call, on 3 Semptember, to ‘destroy’ Thieu may also have suggested to the VC/PAVN that there was a possibility that a coup might be mounted against the government.[37] However, the battle of Nui Le was initiated by an attempted ambush of Australian forces which suggests that 33 PAVN Regiment was not attempting to remain concealed. Instead it may have been attempting to draw Australian forces to the north of the province so that Viet Cong elements such as D445 would have a freer hand in disrupting the election in the populated south.

There was also a temporary increase in enemy initiated incidents in the few days before polling day itself. While enemy initiated incidents were low on polling day in Phuoc Tuy Province, the enemy launched a spate of rocket and mortar attacks on villages elsewhere throughout South Vietnam on polling day apparently aimed at deterring voters.[38]

Polling day

Despite these and other attempts to interfere in the polling, the election took place on 3 October. Diplomats, politicians and journalists from Japan, Italy, the Philippines, Korea, India, UK and Australia took part in an election observation tour. Australian Embassy teams observed the election in various provinces and cities including Hue, Quang Ngai, Danang, Kontum, Pleiku, Nha Trang, Saigon, Cholon, Bien Hoa, Tay Ninh, and others. Contrary to claims that ‘foreign observers remained sceptical’[39] an Australian Embassy new release on polling day recorded that the general impression of the Embassy election observers was that the elections had been ‘fairly and democratically carried out’.[40]

Probably the most important factor in swinging support in favour of Thieu was the absence of an apparently clear alternative and the positive determination of many many people to do nothing to help bring about a return to the conditions of 1964.[41]

Senator Condon Byrne of the Democratic Labor Party was the observer representing the Australian parliament at the election. He gave a glowing report on the conduct of the election to parliament stating that

from what I saw, this ballot completely complied with the conditions and canons which we would require in any electoral system. I could not fault it at all.[42]

Retired General Vanuxem representing France, and Mr Manuel Lim representing the Philippines Chamber of Commerce, both strongly endorsed the election.[43]

While it might be assumed that these official election observers might have been overly generous in their assessments, the same could not be said of Australian Embassy staff. In reports never intended for public disclosure, some Australian Embassy staff members observing the election expressed mild scepticism about voter turnout, but generally agreed that there was a strong level of support for President Thieu. Others thought the result – 87.9% participation and 94.3% for Thieu – was ‘quite believable’.[44] One Australian Embassy election observer, Daniel G. Nutter, abandoned the itinerary prepared by his South Vietnamese hosts and after commandeering a jeep, driver and translator from the mayor of Nha Trang, made a series of unscheduled visits to 15 polling places throughout the city. He stayed at the last polling place he visited to observe the entire count of the ballots. In a lengthy internal Embassy report his assessment of the election was that

From my experience of four elections in Viet-Nam my observations led me to conclude that in this particular election there had been a large turnout and that voters had expressed their views without any undue intimidation and indeed with regard to some of those who voted invalid with a degree of sophistication and discrimination.[45]

Any scepticism about the level of voter turnout was probably the result of the uncontested election.[46] Voters in the 1967 Presidential election had contended with 11 slates. Voting had been slow and crowds had assembled at polling booths while they awaited their turn to cast their ballot. In the uncontested 1971 election voters had only one ballot to deal with. Voting had been quick and there had been few crowds at the polling booths perhaps giving the impression of low attendance.

The results

Of registered voters throughout South Vietnam, 87.9% went to the polls and of those, approximately 94.3% cast a valid vote for Thieu. He received the votes of approximately 83% of registered voters.[47] This was a remarkable achievement in an election for which voting was not compulsory. For comparison, the US election of 1968 which brought Richard Nixon to power achieved a voter turnout of 60.7%. Nixon was elected on 43.4% of the vote.

In Phuoc Tuy Province 96.1% of 55,338 registered voters turned out to vote. Of that number, 95.1% or 50,607 valid votes were cast for Thieu. Only 4.1% of votes were cast invalid.

Shortly after the election President Thieu made a public statement praising the Vietnamese people for their strong voter turnout and support for democracy. He said that on polling day there had been 141 cases of communist terrorism and sabotage aimed at disrupting the election. Fourteen civilians and government employees had been killed and 56 others wounded. The communists had suffered 130 killed, nine captured and 107 weapons captured on polling day.[48]

Conclusion

It is often thought that the people of South Vietnamese craved reunification with the north and the installation of a communist government and that they were prevented from achieving this by repression from the South Vietnamese government supported by the United States. This view is incorrect as the Vietnamese Presidential (and other) elections show. It is also claimed that in the 1971 Presidential election, Thieu forced his competitors, Minh and Ky, out of the race. This is also incorrect. Thieu was widely regarded as the ‘front runner’ in the election. While Minh and Ky withdrew from the race Thieu was doing everything in his power to keep at least one of them in the race. His favoured outcome was a ‘two horse’ race. He was confident he would win against either of them, but in a ‘two horse’ race he would be assured of winning a majority of votes thereby reinforcing the legitimacy of his government. As US forces continued their unilateral withdrawal from the war, and the peace negotiations dragged on in Paris, the building of a government recognised internally and internationally as legitimate was essential for Thieu and the survival of the Republic.

Insurgents resort to armed conflict because they cannot win politically. The Provisional Revolutionary Government’s claim that it represented the true political aspirations of the people of South Vietnam was false. In election after election, culminating in the 1971 Presidential election, the people of South Vietnam cast their ballots overwhelmingly in favour of the government of Nguyen Van Thieu. While South Vietnam continued to face huge political, social, economic and military problems, the majority of citizens always expressed a preference for the Thieu government over reunification under communist control.

Had they contested the election, Ky or Minh could have cast themselves as the loyal opposition, using their electoral support from the 1971 election as a base for their campaign to win the 1975 election when, due to the completion of his two terms allowed under the constitution, Thieu could not run. By withdrawing from the Presidential race Minh and Ky placed their personal political interests above the needs of the Republic. As one commentator noted at the time

The political system [in South Vietnam] is not so much undemocratic as it is pre-democratic. It may never develop beyond that, particularly if the fighting flares up again on a large scale. But the first pieces of genuinely representative government are in place.

To fill in the rest, South Vietnam must develop parties and leaders, especially those who understand the importance of the concept of a loyal opposition. [49]

As the campaigns in Vietnam and more recently in Iraq and Afghanistan show, building political legitimacy (or ‘nation building’) in the host nation is integral to the conduct of COIN campaigns. The Australian doctrine for Counter Revolutionary Warfare, as it was then known, acknowledged this, stating ‘the main part of the struggle is political. …There is no purely military solution’.[50] Rather than turning away from the political struggle, Western militaries intervening on behalf of host nations fighting COIN campaigns must learn how to assist the building of political legitimacy.

Finally, perhaps those who marched in protests against the Vietnam war, and particularly those who favoured a communist victory, should explain why the stated political aspirations of 83% of eligible South Vietnamese voters should have been ignored.

Notes

[1] It should be acknowledged that each of these strategies contained elements of the other.

[2] Le Duan, The Vietnamese Revolution: Fundamental Problems, Essential Tasks, foreign languages publishing house, Hanoi, 1973, p.65.

[3] See Ho Chi Minh, Ho Chi Minh: Selected Writings 1920-1969, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Hanoi, 1973, p. 151 and Robert J. O’Neill, General Giap: Politician and strategist, Cassell, Melbourne, 1969, p. 64.

[4] The Division in Battle, Pamphlet no. 11, Counter Revolutionary Warfare, 1965, Military Board, Army Headquarters, Canberra, 1 March 1966, p. 25.

[5] David Galula, ‘Counterinsurgency warfare: Theory and practice’ in Thomas G. Mahnken and Joseph A. Maiolo (eds.), Strategic Studies: A Reader, Routledge, New York, 2008, pp. 289-290.

[6] US Counterinsurgency FM3-24, Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006, p. 1-5.

[7] For example, Ashley Ekins with Ian McNeill, Fighting to the Finish: The Australian Army and the Vietnam War, 1968-1975, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2012, p.624 devotes one paragraph in a book of 707 pages (excluding appendices), to the election, though the book deals with the Australian Army in Vietnam rather than broader issues of strategy. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History, Pimlico, London, 1994, pp. 650-651, though it does deal with issues of strategy, does little better on the question of the 1971 Presidential election devoting two paragraphs (in 684 pages) to it but getting it wrong in the process.

[8] See the article ‘50^th Anniversary: South Vietnam’s 1967 Presidential election’, for a description of this election. https://vietnam.unsw.adfa.edu.au/category/articles/page/4/

[9] The 1967 Constitution and Presidential election are discussed in the article Bob Hall and Amy Griffin, ‘50^th Anniversary: South Vietnam’s 1967 Presidential Election’ posted on this website.

[10] The NLF announced the formation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government on 8 June 1969.

[11] Shelby L. Stanton, Vietnam Order of Battle, US News books, Washington D.C., n.d., p. 333. See the article ‘Comparison: Force strengths and casualties’. https://vietnam.unsw.adfa.edu.au/category/articles/page/4/

[12] Mark Gillespie, ‘Americans Look Back at Vietnam War: Clinton becomes first U.S. president to visit Vietnam since the 1975 fall of Saigon’, in: https://news.gallup.com/poll/2299/americans-look-back-vietnam-war.aspx 6 March 2020. See the article ‘Gallup Polls #3 – US attitudes to the Vietnam War’. https://vietnam.unsw.adfa.edu.au/gallup-polls-3-us-attitudes-to-the-vietnam-war/

[13] NAA A4531, item 201/2/1/2A Part 4, Saigon – Presidential Election 1971. Lengthy (13 page) paper, by A.M. Morris, Ambassador, to The Hon Nigel Bowen, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Canberra, 8 September 1971. The paper is titled ‘Viet-Nam: The Making of a President: 1971.

[14] For example, in both the United States and Australia, a well-established political party system delivers two dominant political parties ensuring two leading candidates for President and Prime Minister respectively. Minor parties may exert political influence but rarely, if ever, claim the national leadership. Such a system was absent in South Vietnam’s developing democratic system.

[15] Australian Archives, A4531, item 201/2/1/2A Part 4, Saigon – Presidential Elections 1971. Statement by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Mr Marshall Green, to the US House Foreign Relations Committee on 12 Oct 71.

[16] CIA Outlook for the 1971 Presidential Election in South Vietnam, 12 June 1971.

[17] CIA Outlook for the 1971 Presidential Election in South Vietnam, 12 June 1971.

[18] Australian Archives, A4531, item 201/2/1/2A Part 4, Saigon – Presidential Elections 1971. Statement by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Mr Marshall Green, to the US House Foreign Relations Committee on 12 Oct 71. Assembly members, Councillors or Mayors could not endorse more than one candidate.

[19] Issues in Vietnam’s Presidential Election October 3, 1971, Vietnam Report X, The October 3 Election: A Chronology.

[20] Australian Archives, A4531, item 201/2/1/2A Part 4, Saigon – Presidential Elections 1971. Statement by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Mr Marshall Green, to the US House Foreign Relations Committee on 12 Oct 71.

[21] Australian Archives, A4531, item 201/2/1/2A Part 4, Saigon – Presidential Elections 1971. A.M. Morris, Ambassador, to The Hon Nigel Bowen, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Canberra, 8 September 1971. The paper is titled ‘Viet-Nam: The Making of a President: 1971’.

[22] Australian Archives, A4531, item 201/2/1/2A Part 4, Saigon – Presidential Elections 1971. A.M. Morris, Ambassador, to The Hon Nigel Bowen, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Canberra, 8 September 1971. The paper is titled ‘Viet-Nam: The Making of a President: 1971’.

[23] According to a CIA report of September 1971, the Supreme Court’s ruling that Ky was now a valid candidate was influenced by Thieu and his agents. See CIA field appraisal ‘Outlook for the 1971 Presidential Election in South Vietnam’, September 1971.

[24] CIA report, September 1971, ‘Outlook for the 1971 Presidential election in South Vietnam’.

[25] This was a scenario foreseen by the CIA in early June: that if either Minh or Ky withdrew from the race the other would also withdraw claiming that the election was rigged. This would discredit Thieu, create the impression that the election was a farce and fan domestic opposition to Thieu. See CIA Outlook for the 1971 Presidential Election in South Vietnam, June 1971.

[26] Australian Archives, A4531, item 201/2/1/2A Part 4, Saigon – Presidential Elections 1971. A.M. Morris, Ambassador, to The Hon Nigel Bowen, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Canberra, 8 September 1971. The paper is titled ‘Viet-Nam: The Making of a President: 1971

[27] Issues in Vietnam’s Presidential election, October 3, 1971. Nationwide address by President Nguyen Van Thieu, September 2, 1971 (Emphasis in original).

[28] Vietnamese citizens were sophisticated voters. To this point they had voted in the National Constituent Assembly election of September 1966, the Presidential election of September 1967, elections for the upper and lower houses of the National Assembly (including the last lower house election on 29 August 1971 just over one month before the 3 October Presidential election) and numerous village and hamlet elections. Voting was not compulsory.

[29] Australian Archives, A4531, item 201/2/1/2A Part 4, Saigon – Presidential Elections, 1971. Australian embassy Saigon outward cable to Foreign Canberra, 1 October 1971.

[30] Australian Archives, A4531, item 201/2/1/2A Part 4, Saigon – Presidential Elections, 1971. Australian embassy Saigon outward cable to Foreign Canberra, 1 October 1971.

[31] See the articles relating to the battle on this website

[32] Ashley Ekins with Ian McNeill, Fighting to the Finish: The Australian Army and the Vietnam War, 1968-1975, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1012, p. 623.

[33] AWM121, item 4/B/6 Part III, Operations – SVN – AFV Monthly Reports. Australian Force Vietnam, Monthly Report, September 1971, dated 15 Oct 71. Corps Tactical Zones had been reorganized into Military Regions as the result of a decree passed by the Thieu government on 1 July 1970.

[34] AWM121, item 4/B/6 Part III, Operations – SVN – AFV Monthly Reports. Australian Force Vietnam, Monthly Report, September 1971, dated 15 Oct 71.

[35] AWM121, item 4/B/6 Part III, Operations – SVN – AFV Monthly Reports. Australian Force Vietnam, Monthly Report, September 1971, dated 15 Oct 71.

[36] There are other reasons why the battle of Nui Le is unlikely to have been an attempt to inflict a ‘bloody nose’ on 1ATF. With the US and Free World Forces rapidly withdrawing from Vietnam it was in the interests of the VC/PAVN to preserve their forces for the fight against ARVN rather than to risk them on an essentially useless task.

[37] CIA field appraisal ‘Outlook for the 1971 Presidential Election in South Vietnam’, September 1971.

[38] AWM121, item 4/B/6 Part III, Operations – SVN – AFV Monthly Reports. Australian Force Vietnam, Monthly Report, October 1971, dated 15 November 1971.

[39] Ashley Ekins with Ian McNeill, Fighting to the Finish: The Australian Army and the Vietnam War, 1968-1975, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 2012, p. 624.

[40] Australian Archives A4531, item 201/2/1/2A Part 4, Saigon – Presidential Elections, 1971.  News Release, 3 October 1971.

[41] Australian Archives A4531, item 201/2/1/2A Part 4, Saigon – Presidential Elections, 1971.  News Release, 3 Oct 71. Following the 1963 coup which toppled the Diem regime there had been a period of short-lived governments, some lasting only a matter of days before they too were toppled.

[42] Vietnam Bulletin: A semi-monthly publication of the Embassy of Vietnam, vol. VI, no. 11, November 10, 1971. The bulletin quotes Senator Byrne from Hansard.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Australian Archives A4531, item 201/2/1/2A Part 4, Saigon – Presidential Elections, 1971. Unsigned and undated note to file: ‘The Liberal Hour in I Corps’.

[45] Australian Archives, A4531, item 201/2/1/2A Part 4, Saigon – Presidential Elections 1971. Australian Embassy Saigon, paper for file, dated 6 October 1971, by D.G. Nutter.

[46] Ashley Ekins with Ian McNeill, Fighting to the Finish: The Australian Army and the Vietnam War, 1968-1975, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 2012, p. 624. Ekins comments that ‘Foreign observers remained sceptical’ of the election results, but this is not born out by Australian Embassy and other reports.

[47] Australian Archives, A4531, item 201/2/1/2A Part 4, Saigon – Presidential Elections 1971. Statement by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Mr Marshall Green, to the US House Foreign Relations Committee on 12 October 1971.

[48] Australian Archives, A4531, item 201/2/1/2A Part 4, Saigon – Presidential Elections 1971. Letter, Mr N.J. Spurr, Second Secretary, Australian Embassy Vietnam, to The Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra, 15 October 1971.

[49] Gerald L. Steibel, ‘The Presidential Election’, in Focus on Vietnam: A series of reprints by the American Friends of Vietnam – 342 Madison Avenue New York, N.Y. 10017, Reprint No. 12, October 1971.

[50] The Division in Battle, Pamphlet no. 11, Counter Revolutionary Warfare, 1965, Military Board, Army Headquarters, Canberra, 1 March 1966, p. 25.